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The Treasury auction process: objectives, structure, and recent acquisitions

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  • Kenneth D. Garbade
  • Jeffrey F. Ingber

Abstract

Treasury auctions are designed to minimize the cost of financing the national debt by promoting broad, competitive bidding and liquid secondary market trading. A review of the auction process-from the announcement of a new issue to the delivery of securities-reveals how these objectives have been met. Also highlighted are changes in the auction process that stem from recent advances in information-processing technologies and risk management techniques.

Suggested Citation

  • Kenneth D. Garbade & Jeffrey F. Ingber, 2005. "The Treasury auction process: objectives, structure, and recent acquisitions," Current Issues in Economics and Finance, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 11(Feb).
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednci:y:2005:i:feb:n:v.11no.2
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Simon, David P., 1994. "Markups, quantity risk, and bidding strategies at treasury coupon auctions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 43-62, February.
    2. Cammack, Elizabeth B, 1991. "Evidence on Bidding Strategies and the Information in Treasury Bill Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(1), pages 100-130, February.
    3. Nyborg, Kjell G. & Sundaresan, Suresh, 1996. "Discriminatory versus uniform Treasury auctions: Evidence from when-issued transactions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 63-104, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Basil Guggenheim & Mario Meichle & Thomas Nellen, 2019. "Confederation debt management since 1970," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics, Springer;Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics, vol. 155(1), pages 1-23, December.
    2. Tobias Adrian & Brian Begalle & Adam Copeland & Antoine Martin, 2013. "Repo and Securities Lending," NBER Chapters, in: Risk Topography: Systemic Risk and Macro Modeling, pages 131-148, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Athanasios Geromichalos & Lucas Herrenbrueck, 2016. "Monetary Policy, Asset Prices, and Liquidity in Over‐the‐Counter Markets," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(1), pages 35-79, February.
    4. Bruce Mizrach & Christopher J. Neely, 2007. "The microstructure of the U.S. treasury market," Working Papers 2007-052, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    5. Smith, A. Lee & Valcarcel, Victor J., 2023. "The financial market effects of unwinding the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 146(C).
    6. Robert S. Kravchuk, 2020. "Post‐Keynesian Public Budgeting & Finance: Assessing Contributions From Modern Monetary Theory," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(3), pages 95-123, September.
    7. Rydqvist, Kristian & Wu, Mark, 2014. "Pre-Auction Inventory and Bidding Behavior?An Analysis of Canadian Treasury Auctions," CEPR Discussion Papers 10112, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. James W. Douglas & Ringa Raudla, 2020. "Who is Afraid of the Big Bad Debt? A Modern Money Theory Perspective on Federal Deficits and Debt," Public Budgeting & Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(3), pages 6-25, September.
    9. Pasquariello, Paolo & Vega, Clara, 2009. "The on-the-run liquidity phenomenon," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 1-24, April.
    10. Bruce Mizrach & Christopher J. Neely, 2006. "The transition to electronic communications networks in the secondary treasury market," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 88(Nov), pages 527-542.
    11. Yuriy Gorodnichenko & Walker Ray, 2017. "The Effects of Quantitative Easing: Taking a Cue from Treasury Auctions," NBER Working Papers 24122, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Amin, Shehryar & Tédongap, Roméo, 2023. "The changing landscape of treasury auctions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).

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