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Um modelo de programação com risco para a agricultura do Nordeste

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  • Ferreira, Léo Rocha

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  • Ferreira, Léo Rocha, 1980. "Um modelo de programação com risco para a agricultura do Nordeste," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil), vol. 34(3), July.
    • Handle: RePEc:fgv:epgrbe:v:34:y:1980:i:3:a:2632
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    File URL: https://periodicos.fgv.br/rbe/article/view/2632
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    1. John L. Dillon & J. R. Anderson, 1971. "Allocative Efficiency, Traditional Agriculture, and Risk," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 53(1), pages 26-32.
    2. Edgardo Moscardi & Alain de Janvry, 1977. "Attitudes Toward Risk Among Peasants: An Econometric Approach," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 59(4), pages 710-716.
    3. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1974. "Incentives and Risk Sharing in Sharecropping," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 41(2), pages 219-255.
    4. Amartya K. Sen, 1966. "Peasants and Dualism with or without Surplus Labor," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 74(5), pages 425-425.
    5. Earl O. Heady, 1947. "Economics of Farm Leasing Systems," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 29(3), pages 659-678.
    6. Rainer Schickele, 1941. "Effect of Tenure Systems on Agricultural Efficiency," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 23(1), pages 185-207.
    7. Newbery, D M G, 1974. "Cropsharing Tenancy in Agriculture: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(6), pages 1060-1066, December.
    8. Rao, C H Hanumantha, 1971. "Uncertainty, Entrepreneurship, and Sharecropping in India," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(3), pages 578-595, May-June.
    9. Charles Issawi, 1957. "Farm Output under Fixed Rents and Share Tenancy," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 33(1), pages 74-77.
    10. Kutcher, Gary P. & Scandizzo, Pasquale L., 1976. "A partial analysis of sharetenancy relationships in Northeast Brazil," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 343-354, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rezende, Gervasio Castro de, 2006. "Políticas Trabalhista, Fundiária E De Crédito Agrícola E Pobreza No Brasil," 44th Congress, July 23-27, 2006, Fortaleza, Ceará, Brazil 147500, Sociedade Brasileira de Economia, Administracao e Sociologia Rural (SOBER).
    2. Lastarria-Cornhiel, Susana & Melmed-Sanjak, Jolyne, 1999. "Land Tenancy In Asia, Africa, And Latin America: A Look At The Past And A View To The Future," Working Papers 12783, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Land Tenure Center.
    3. Jardim, Ana Lucia Carvalho & Ferreira, Leo da Rocha, 2008. "Potencialidade Do Seguro Rural No Brasil," 46th Congress, July 20-23, 2008, Rio Branco, Acre, Brazil 109766, Sociedade Brasileira de Economia, Administracao e Sociologia Rural (SOBER).

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