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Strategic Commitment and Three-Stage Games with Labour-Managed and Profit-Maximizing Firms

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  • Kazuhiro Ohnishi

    (Osaka University)

Abstract

This paper examines two three-stage games with a labor-managed income-perworker- maximizing firm and a profit-maximizing firm. In the first stage, the labormanaged firm (resp. the profit-maximizing firm) decides whether to make a commitment to capacity. In the second stage, the other firm decides on a commitment to capacity. In the third stage, both firms non-cooperatively choose quantities. The paper shows the equilibrium outcomes of the two three-stage games. The paper then finds that the introduction of capacity commitment into the analysis of threestage mixed market games is profitable for the labor-managed firm while it is not profitable for the profit-maximizing firm.

Suggested Citation

  • Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2009. "Strategic Commitment and Three-Stage Games with Labour-Managed and Profit-Maximizing Firms," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 22(2), pages 63-74, Autumn.
    • Handle: RePEc:fep:journl:v:22:y:2009:i:2:p:63-74
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • L20 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - General

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