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Why and How to Assess Inflation-Target Fulfillment

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Abstract

The ex post analysis of inflation-target fulfillment plays an important role in the inflation-targeting framework. The major benefits of ex post analysis are threefold. First, it improves forecast accuracy. Knowledge of the main sources of previous forecast inaccuracies helps to better understand the current state of the economy and prevents a central bank from producing systematically biased forecasts. Second, it elucidates the abilities and limitations of forecasts used in central-bank decision making. Third, it enhances monetary-policy transparency and credibility.The primary aim of the paper is to propose a methodological framework for assessing inflation-target fulfillment based on partial simulations, as applied in the Czech National Bank. In order to demonstrate the applicability of this framework, the authors analyze the performance of the bank between 2002 and 2006. They show that inflation targeting in this period might have been negatively affected by biased variables describing external developments.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan Filáèek, 2007. "Why and How to Assess Inflation-Target Fulfillment," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 57(11-12), pages 577-594, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:fau:fauart:v:57:y:2007:i:11-12:p:577-594
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Frederic S Mishkin, 2004. "Can Central Bank Transparency Go Too Far?," RBA Annual Conference Volume (Discontinued), in: Christopher Kent & Simon Guttmann (ed.),The Future of Inflation Targeting, Reserve Bank of Australia.
    2. Ales Bulir & Jaromir Hurnik, 2006. "The Maastricht Inflation Criterion: "Saints" and "Sinners"," Working Papers 2006/8, Czech National Bank.
    3. Georgios Chortareas & David Stasavage & Gabriel Sterne, 2002. "Does it pay to be transparent? international evidence form central bank forecasts," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 84(Jul), pages 99-118.
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    Cited by:

    1. Tomáš Holub, 2008. "Causes of Deviations from the CNB’s Inflation Targets: An Empirical Analysis," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 58(09-10), pages 425-433, December.
    2. Ms. Katerina Smídková & Viktor Kotlán & David Navrátil & Mr. Aleš Bulíř, 2008. "Inflation Targeting and Communication: It Pays Off to Read Inflation Reports," IMF Working Papers 2008/234, International Monetary Fund.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    central bank; inflation target; monetary-policy performance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E47 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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