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Neither Lucky Nor Good - The Case of Electricity Deregulation in California

Author

Listed:
  • Jason P. Martinek

    (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, USA)

  • Michael J. Orlando

    (Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, USA)

Abstract

We present an integrated summary of the various factors that contributed to shortages of electrical power in California in 2000. Several necessary conditions for the crisis are identified. We conclude that a sufficient remedy may be defined by policies that mitigate the limited incentives to invest in transmission capacity.

Suggested Citation

  • Jason P. Martinek & Michael J. Orlando, 2002. "Neither Lucky Nor Good - The Case of Electricity Deregulation in California," The Economic and Social Review, Economic and Social Studies, vol. 33(1), pages 75-82.
    • Handle: RePEc:eso:journl:v:33:y:2002:i:1:p:75-82
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    File URL: http://www.esr.ie/Vol33_1Orlando.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2002
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Severin Borenstein & James. Bushnell & Steven Stoft, 2000. "The Competitive Effects of Transmission Capacity in A Deregulated Electricity Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(2), pages 294-325, Summer.
    2. Paul L. Joskow & Edward Kohn, 2002. "A Quantitative Analysis of Pricing Behavior in California's Wholesale Electricity Market During Summer 2000," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Number 4), pages 1-35.
    3. Severin Borenstein & James Bushnell & Frank Wolak, 2000. "Diagnosing Market Power in California's Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market," NBER Working Papers 7868, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Edomah, Norbert & Foulds, Chris & Jones, Aled, 2017. "Influences on energy supply infrastructure: A comparison of different theoretical perspectives," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 765-778.
    2. Bye, Torstein & Bruvoll, Annegrete & Aune, Finn Roar, 2008. "Inflow shortages in deregulated power markets -- Reasons for concern?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(4), pages 1693-1711, July.
    3. Torstein Bye & Annegrete Bruvoll & Finn Roar Aune, 2006. "The importance of volatility in inflow in a deregulated hydro-dominated power market," Discussion Papers 472, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    4. Johan WILLNER & Sonja GRÖNBLOM, 2015. "The Organisation of Services of General Interest in Finland," CIRIEC Working Papers 1520, CIRIEC - Université de Liège.
    5. Johan Willner & Sonja Gronblom, 2016. "The organisation of services of general interest in Finland," ECONOMIA PUBBLICA, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2016(3), pages 89-116.

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