IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/erp/eiopxx/p0103.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Corporate Lobbying in the European Parliament

Author

Listed:
  • Bouwen, Pieter

Abstract

This paper is an attempt to empirically test a theory of access that investigates the logic behind the apparent ad hoc lobbying behavior of business interests in the European Parliament. The theoretical framework tries to explain the degree of access of different organizational forms of business interest representation (companies, associations and consultants) to the European Parliament in terms of a theory of the supply and demand of "access goods". The generated hypotheses are analyzed in an empirical study of the EU financial services sector. On the basis of 14 exploratory and 27 semi-structured interviews the hypotheses are checked in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the European Parliament.

Suggested Citation

  • Bouwen, Pieter, 2003. "A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Corporate Lobbying in the European Parliament," European Integration online Papers (EIoP), European Community Studies Association Austria (ECSA-A), vol. 7, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:erp:eiopxx:p0103
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2003-011a.htm
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2003-011.htm
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/pdf/2003-011.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Potters, Jan & Van Winden, Frans, 1990. "Modelling political pressure as transmission of information," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 61-88, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Raj Chari & Daniel Hillebrand O'Donovan, 2011. "Lobbying the European Commission: Open or secret?," Working Papers 2011-11, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
    2. Libman, Alexander, 2005. "Взаимодействие Государственных И Частных Структур В Интеграционных Группировах: Теоретические Подходы И Опыт Снг [Interaction of Public and Private Actors in Regional Integration Groups - Theoretic," MPRA Paper 17044, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Benoît Le Maux, 2009. "Governmental behavior in representative democracy: a synthesis of the theoretical literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(3), pages 447-465, December.
    2. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/8523 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R, 2023. "Formal Theories of Special Interest Influence," SocArXiv 47e26, Center for Open Science.
    4. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/8523 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Cornelia Woll & Alvaro Artigas, 2007. "When trade liberalization turns into regulatory reform: The impact on business–government relations in international trade politics," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 1(2), pages 121-138, June.
    6. Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R, 2023. "Dark Money and Politician Learning," SocArXiv 3bzex, Center for Open Science.
    7. Zerbini, Antoine, 2023. "The Case for Lobbying Transparency," SocArXiv w6vam, Center for Open Science.
    8. Bombardini, Matilde & Trebbi, Francesco, 2012. "Competition and political organization: Together or alone in lobbying for trade policy?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 18-26.
    9. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/8526 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Gullberg, Anne Therese, 2008. "Lobbying friends and foes in climate policy: The case of business and environmental interest groups in the European Union," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(8), pages 2954-2962, August.
    11. Randolph Sloof & Frans van Winden, 2000. "Show Them Your Teeth First!," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1), pages 81-120, July.
    12. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/8523 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Schnakenberg, Keith & Schumock, Collin & Turner, Ian R, 2023. "Dark Money and Voter Learning," SocArXiv r562d, Center for Open Science.
    14. Johnson Kakeu & Erik Paul Johnson, 2018. "Information Exchange and Transnational Environmental Problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 71(2), pages 583-604, October.
    15. Andreas Broscheid & David Coen, 2003. "Insider and Outsider Lobbying of the European Commission," European Union Politics, , vol. 4(2), pages 165-189, June.
    16. Broscheid, Andreas & Coen, David, 2006. "Lobbying systems in the European Union: A quantitative study," MPIfG Working Paper 06/3, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    17. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/8523 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/8526 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/8526 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Cornelia Woll & Alvaro Artigas, 2007. "When Trade Liberalization Turns into Regulatory Reform: The Impact on Business-Government Relations in International Trade Politics," Post-Print hal-01071209, HAL.
    21. Ha, Arthur & Stoneham, Gary & Harris, Jane & Fisher, Bill & Strappazzon, Loris, 2005. "Incentives, Information & Drought Policy," 2005 Conference (49th), February 9-11, 2005, Coff's Harbour, Australia 137924, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
    22. Cornelia Woll, 2006. "Lobbying in the European Union: From Sui Generis to a Comparative Perspective," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01021182, HAL.
    23. Bils, Peter & Duggan, John & Judd, Gleason, 2021. "Lobbying and policy extremism in repeated elections," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 193(C).
    24. Bilgehan Karabay, 2009. "Lobbying Under Asymmetric Information," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(1), pages 1-41, March.
    25. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/8526 is not listed on IDEAS
    26. Adam W Chalmers, 2013. "With a lot of help from their friends: Explaining the social logic of informational lobbying in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 14(4), pages 475-496, December.
    27. Schnakenberg, Keith & Turner, Ian R, 2019. "Signaling with Reform: How the Threat of Corruption Prevents Informed Policymaking," SocArXiv jkvz6, Center for Open Science.
    28. David P Baron, 2019. "Lobbying dynamics," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 31(3), pages 403-452, July.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:erp:eiopxx:p0103. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Editorial Assistant (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ecsaaea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.