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Does overlapping membership on audit and compensation committees improve a firm's financial reporting quality?

Author

Listed:
  • Nandini Chandar
  • Hsihui Chang
  • Xiaochuan Zheng

Abstract

Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to examine whether audit committee members of the board prove to be better monitors if they are also on the compensation committee, as they would be more attuned to compensation related earnings management incentives. Design/methodology/approach - The paper uses archival data on a sample of nonfinancial S&P 500 firms representing 1,032 firm years over the period 2003‐2005, and discretionary accruals as a proxy for financial reporting quality. Findings - Firms with overlapping audit and compensation committees have higher financial reporting quality than those without such overlap. In addition, there is an inverted U‐shaped relationship between overlapping magnitude and financial reporting quality, suggesting that there are costs as well as benefits to overlapping committees. Practical implications - The findings on this paper have implications for recent policy deliberations on the composition of board committees in general and audit committees in particular, as they clarify the benefits of overlapping committee members. Originality/value - Understanding the costs and benefits of the board committee structure is particularly important as boards typically operate through the use of committees. This paper contributes to this area by considering the effect of overlapping memberships on two of the most active and important board committees – the compensation and audit committees – on the monitoring effectiveness of the audit committee.

Suggested Citation

  • Nandini Chandar & Hsihui Chang & Xiaochuan Zheng, 2012. "Does overlapping membership on audit and compensation committees improve a firm's financial reporting quality?," Review of Accounting and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 11(2), pages 141-165, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eme:rafpps:v:11:y:2012:i:2:p:141-165
    DOI: 10.1108/14757701211228192
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Redhwan Al‐Dhamari & Abdulsalam Saad Alquhaif & Bakr Ali Al‐Gamrh, 2022. "Modelling the impact of audit/remuneration committee overlap on debtholders' perceptions of accounting information quality: The role of CEO power," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(3), pages 2898-2920, July.
    3. Ahsan Habib & Md. Borhan Uddin Bhuiyan, 2016. "Overlapping Membership on Audit and Compensation Committees and Financial Reporting Quality," Australian Accounting Review, CPA Australia, vol. 26(1), pages 76-90, March.
    4. Fernández Méndez, Carlos & Pathan, Shams & Arrondo García, Rubén, 2015. "Monitoring capabilities of busy and overlap directors: Evidence from Australia," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 35(PA), pages 444-469.
    5. Ding, Bin Yan & Wei, Feng, 2023. "Overlapping membership between risk management committee and audit committee and bank risk-taking: Evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    6. Mary Ellen Carter & Luann J. Lynch & Melissa A. Martin, 2022. "Board Committee Overlap and the Use of Earnings in CEO Compensation Contracts," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(8), pages 6268-6297, August.
    7. Wan-Hussin, Wan Nordin & Fitri, Hadiati & Salim, Basariah, 2021. "Audit committee chair overlap, chair expertise, and internal auditing practices: Evidence from Malaysia," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 44(C).
    8. Tao, Ngoc Bich & Hutchinson, Marion, 2013. "Corporate governance and risk management: The role of risk management and compensation committees," Journal of Contemporary Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 83-99.
    9. Walied Keshk & Hung‐Yuan (Richard) Lu & Vivek Mande, 2020. "How have US banks adopted the Financial Accounting Standards Board's Level 3 fair value disclosure rules?," Accounting and Finance, Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand, vol. 60(S1), pages 693-727, April.
    10. Ayad Ahmed Mohammed Al-Qublani & Hasnah Kamardin & Rohami Shafie, 2020. "Audit Committee Chair Attributes and Audit Report Lag in an Emerging Market," International Journal of Financial Research, International Journal of Financial Research, Sciedu Press, vol. 11(4), pages 475-492, July.

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