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Busy boards and corporate earnings management: an international analysis

Author

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  • Stephen P. Ferris
  • Min-Yu (Stella) Liao

Abstract

Purpose - Because of our limited understanding of the incidence and effect of board busyness globally, the mixed evidence of the effect of board busyness obtained in the USA and the divergence of international patterns of director busyness from that observed in the USA, the author contends that there is a strong need to examine board busyness from a global perspective. The literature, however, does not examine the effect of board busyness on reported earnings quality and certainly does not analyze it internationally. Consequently, the purpose of this study is to examine the effect of multiple board appointments on the quality of a firm’s reported earnings. Design/methodology/approach - The research design for this study is empirical. It uses both univariate and multivariate statistical analysis to examine historical corporate accounting, finance and governance data. Findings - Consistent with the busyness hypothesis of corporate governance, the author finds that firms with a higher proportion of busy independent directors or busy CEOs manage their earnings more extensively. Further, the findings of this study present that firms with a higher proportion of busy independent audit committee members have poorer financial reporting quality. Using a sample of American Depository Receipts (ADRs), this study determines that the ineffectiveness of busy boards regarding earnings management is mitigated by the listing regulations imposed by US exchanges. Research limitations/implications - The author believes that this study offers new and important evidence regarding the debate whether busy directors provide knowledge, skill and corporate connections, or whether they are overextended and, thus, unable to fully perform their monitoring duties. This study shows that firms with busy directors are associated with poorer financial reporting quality and, consistent with the busyness hypothesis, are less effective as managerial monitors. Practical implications - This study provides useful guidance regarding board design and the kinds of policies that firms should adopt regarding multiple boarding. Social implications - The social implications focus on the public policy implications regarding the importance of effective corporate governance in the reporting of financial wealth, wealth creation and wealth management. Originality/value - This is the first study that examines the relation between board/committee busyness and corporate earnings management using a comprehensive set of international firms. Second, the author expands the analysis of audit committee into a new dimension: committee quality as captured by the busyness of its independent members. This study also contributes to the ongoing debate in the corporate finance literature regarding the reputation and busyness hypotheses of multiple directorships.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephen P. Ferris & Min-Yu (Stella) Liao, 2019. "Busy boards and corporate earnings management: an international analysis," Review of Accounting and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 18(4), pages 533-556, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:eme:rafpps:raf-07-2017-0144
    DOI: 10.1108/RAF-07-2017-0144
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Le, Quyen & Vafaei, Alireza & Ahmed, Kamran & Kutubi, Shawgat, 2022. "Independent directors' reputation incentives and firm performance – an Australian perspective," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    2. Ibrahim Amayreh & Husam Ananzeh & Abdullah Bugshan, 2024. "The Impact of Board of Directors and Islamic Shariah on Company Internal Control: Evidence from Jordan," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 14(1), pages 39-51, January.
    3. Kin-Wai Lee & Char-Lee Lok, 2020. "Busy Boards, Firm Performance and Operating Risk," Asian Academy of Management Journal of Accounting and Finance (AAMJAF), Penerbit Universiti Sains Malaysia, vol. 16(2), pages 1-21.
    4. Cole, Rebel & Johan, Sofia & Schweizer, Denis, 2021. "Corporate failures: Declines, collapses, and scandals," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    5. Pamela Brandes & Ravi Dharwadkar & Jonathan F. Ross & Linna Shi, 2022. "Time is of the Essence!: Retired Independent Directors’ Contributions to Board Effectiveness," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 179(3), pages 767-793, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Earnings management; Governance; Boards; Busy; Audit; M41; M42; G3; G34;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • M42 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Auditing
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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