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Knowledge production: public management and the market spectacle

Author

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  • Terence M. Garrett
  • Arthur Sementelli

Abstract

Purpose - Public management is moving towards more control by executives in the name of the people. Executive knowledge is privileged by initiatives such as new public management and collaborative public management that promote the market spectacle. The purpose of this paper is to employ a “radical,” or critical, interpretation based primarily on concepts and social critiques developed by Marx, by Weber and by Debord, to offer a position, polemic, and perspective regarding the nature and effects of public management on the American polis. Design/methodology/approach - The authors develop a social critique of bureaucracy and government towards domination governance of the polis primarily by developing and using the theoretical work of scholars such as Marx, Weber, and Debord for this analysis. Findings - These developments towards more control by executives are corrosive to the last vestiges of representative democracy in the USA. Originality/value - The question remains as to whether it is too late to reform, or turn back, the onset of the new public managerialism and whether the current condition of public administration is a symptom of the overall market spectacle trend.

Suggested Citation

  • Terence M. Garrett & Arthur Sementelli, 2012. "Knowledge production: public management and the market spectacle," International Journal of Social Economics, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 39(7), pages 456-473, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eme:ijsepp:v:39:y:2012:i:7:p:456-473
    DOI: 10.1108/03068291211231650
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Epstein, Gil S. & Gang, Ira N., 2009. "Good governance and good aid allocation," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 12-18, May.
    2. Leroy P. Jones & Pankaj Tandon & Ingo Vogelsang, 1990. "Selling Public Enterprises: A Cost/Benefit Methodology," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262600625, April.
    3. Alessandro Zattoni & Francesca Cuomo, 2008. "Why Adopt Codes of Good Governance? A Comparison of Institutional and Efficiency Perspectives," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(1), pages 1-15, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Juliani, Fernando & de Oliveira, Otávio José, 2016. "State of research on public service management: Identifying scientific gaps from a bibliometric study," International Journal of Information Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(6), pages 1033-1041.

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