Exploring the effects of director network on open innovation: the moderating role of CEO short-sightedness

Purpose - This paper aims to explore the effects of director network on open innovation. As an informal institutional arrangement, the director network is an important source for the enterprise to obtain external information, which provide resource basis for open innovation. Chief Executive Officer (CEO) as the top of management team could make short-sighted decisions for personal interests; this paper also investigates the moderating role of CEO short-sightedness between director network and open innovation. Design/methodology/approach - This paper takes 4,102 Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2020 as the research sample. By introducing network centrality and structural hole to measure director network and using data mining to extract key words related to CEO short-sightedness from annual reports, this paper constructs several multiple linear regression models to analyze the impact of director network on open innovation and the moderating role of CEO short-sightedness. Findings - The analysis finds that director network can facilitate corporate open innovation. Enterprises can acquire more external resources in high centrality and structural hole of director network and promote ability for corporate open innovation. The relationship between director network and open innovation is negatively moderated by CEO short-sightedness. When the level of corporate governance and analyst attention is high, the negative effect of CEO short-sightedness on the innovation effect of directors’ networks is suppressed. Originality/value - This is the first empirical paper to investigate the promotion effect of director network on open innovation as well as the negative moderating role of CEO short-sightedness. The findings bring new perspectives to the open innovation and enlightenments for practical activities from social relationship aspect.