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The Political Economy of Property Rights

Author

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  • Gary D. Libecap

    (University of California, Santa Bárbara. Estados Unidos)

Abstract

Even though the assigning of the formal property rights are the most obvious response to externalities involving the environment and natural resources, they typically are not the first action taken. Indeed, they often are the last, coming only after a crisis. Why is that? One reason is that property rights are costly to define. Property rights involve political costs because they define ownership and hence a distribution of wealth, status, and political influence. As a result, they often are controversial and political risk leads politicians to delay in assigning rights. A crisis can resolve distributional disputes by making the benefits of taking action or the costs of not doing so clearer. For this reason, it may be efficient and politically understandable why property rights are adopted late.

Suggested Citation

  • Gary D. Libecap, 2011. "The Political Economy of Property Rights," EKONOMIAZ. Revista vasca de Economía, Gobierno Vasco / Eusko Jaurlaritza / Basque Government, vol. 77(02), pages 52-63.
  • Handle: RePEc:ekz:ekonoz:2011204
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Eric C. Edwards & Martin Fiszbein & Gary D. Libecap, 2022. "Property Rights to Land and Agricultural Organization: An Argentina–United States Comparison," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(S1), pages 1-33.
    2. Edwards, Griffin & Robinson, Joshua J., 2019. "You gotta fight for your right? Publicly assigned but privately enforced property rights," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 31-39.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    property rights; constituencies; politicians;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • O21 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Planning Models; Planning Policy
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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