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Does Cash Contribute to Value? A Comparison of Constrained and Unconstrained Firms in China and Germany

Author

Listed:
  • Wei Zhang

    (University of Groningen, IFM-FEB, Netherlands)

  • Henk von Eije

    (University of Groningen, Netherlands)

  • Wim Westerman

    (University of Groningen, Netherlands)

Abstract

A fundamental characteristic of emerging markets is the underdevelopment of legal institutions and financial markets. Therefore, the marginal value of a firm’s cash holdings in emerging countries can be lower than 1, due to high agency costs resulting from poor external corporate governance. However, the marginal value of cash may also be high in emerging markets because the information asymmetry between current and new providers of funds is high, which means that it is difficult to access the (low quality) capital markets. We study for the industrialized countries of China and Germany whether corporate cash holdings contribute to shareholder value in both constrained and unconstrained firms. In contradiction to previous literature on emerging markets, we find that the marginal value of cash is not smaller than 1 in China, so that agency costs do not dominate. We, however, find marginal values of cash lower than 1 for unconstrained firms in both countries, implying that in these firms agency costs of cash holdings exist. For constrained firms we find marginal values significantly larger than 1 in both countries. This indicates difficulties in accessing the financial markets for these firms. These difficulties prove to be larger in China than in Germany for small and service firms, but not for high growth firms.

Suggested Citation

  • Wei Zhang & Henk von Eije & Wim Westerman, 2015. "Does Cash Contribute to Value? A Comparison of Constrained and Unconstrained Firms in China and Germany," Eurasian Journal of Economics and Finance, Eurasian Publications, vol. 3(4), pages 22-38.
    • Handle: RePEc:ejn:ejefjr:v:3:y:2015:i:4:p:22-38
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Nidhi Singh, 2018. "Effect of Cash Holding Policy of Financially Constrained Firms on Their Market Performance," Management and Labour Studies, XLRI Jamshedpur, School of Business Management & Human Resources, vol. 43(1-2), pages 31-45, February.

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