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Cooperatives for fruits and vegetables in emerging countries: Rationalization and impact of decentralization

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  • Palsule-Desai, Omkar D.

Abstract

We develop a (noncooperative) game theoretic model for a decentralized setting wherein fringe farmers compete with a two-tier cooperative network involving network farmers and a coordinator. We examine the roles of the coordinator and profit sharing in allocating costs/benefits of externalities in enhancing network efficiency and stability. Our main finding is that using profit sharing based mechanism the coordinator can overcome inherent inefficiency and instability of decentralization and noncooperative behavior of the network farmers. The roles of the coordinator and profit sharing are particularly important when it is economical for both network and fringe farmers to supply the product.

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  • Palsule-Desai, Omkar D., 2015. "Cooperatives for fruits and vegetables in emerging countries: Rationalization and impact of decentralization," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 114-140.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:transe:v:81:y:2015:i:c:p:114-140
    DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2015.06.011
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    Cited by:

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    5. Palsule-Desai, Omkar D., 2021. "Multi-product supply networks: Implications of intermediaries," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 292(3), pages 909-929.
    6. Omkar D. Palsule-Desai, 2016. "Impact of equity and equality on stability and collusion in a decentralized network," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 238(1), pages 411-447, March.

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