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Behavioral mechanism design for transportation services: Laboratory experiments and preference elicitation cost

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  • Hara, Yusuke

Abstract

We herein use the results of laboratory experiments to study the effects of preference-elicitation mechanisms on the efficiency of auctions. Transportation and reservation service providers need to know the potential user demand. However, the preference-elicitation method can impact the elicitation results. In this study, we experimentally analyze the effects of preference-elicitation mechanisms on users’ eliciting behaviors and on the efficiency of auction results. In addition, we show that our preference-elicitation mechanism can reduce users’ bidding cost and improve the efficiency of auction results. Finally, we examine users’ behaviors in laboratory experiments to estimate their preference-elicitation costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Hara, Yusuke, 2018. "Behavioral mechanism design for transportation services: Laboratory experiments and preference elicitation cost," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 231-245.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:transb:v:115:y:2018:i:c:p:231-245
    DOI: 10.1016/j.trb.2018.07.008
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    1. Bian, Zheyong & Liu, Xiang & Bai, Yun, 2020. "Mechanism design for on-demand first-mile ridesharing," Transportation Research Part B: Methodological, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 77-117.

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