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Influence of rent-seeking on safety supervision in Chinese construction: Based on a simulation technology

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  • Feng, Qun
  • Shi, Xuejun
  • Zhang, Jianghua

Abstract

Although safety supervision systems for construction in China continue to improve, the rate of accidents remains high. Concerns have also been raised over the frequent occurrence of rent-seeking and its influence on the efficient enforcement of safety supervision systems. To solve the problem whereby rent-seeking causes accidents by affecting the safe supervision of construction, a conceptual model is built in this study to examine the relation between safety management departments and construction enterprises. Based on a questionnaire survey of a number of construction enterprises, a simulation using the Back Propagation neural network learning algorithm and the MATLAB tool was run to study the interactions among the stakeholders in safety supervision to observe the impact of rent-seeking on the related benefits and safety statuses of construction projects. The results revealed the following: 1) The choices of enterprises were influenced by anticipated profits and costs. 2) The accident rate under the rent-seeking (YSYR) scenario was between those of the no-supervision (NSNR) and no-rent-seeking (YSNR) scenarios; thus, rent-seeking weakens the regulation utility of safety supervision. 3) As the tendency for rent-seeking increases, so does the number of accidents in the short term, whereas it fluctuates in the long term. 4) The existence of a critical interval causes the incomes of enterprises to exhibit a trend of stable increase with increase in rent-seeking tendency. 5) Working motivation is the most sensitive factor to the tendency for rent-seeking. 6) Capital productivity is more important than labor productivity but both are indispensable to profits of enterprises.

Suggested Citation

  • Feng, Qun & Shi, Xuejun & Zhang, Jianghua, 2019. "Influence of rent-seeking on safety supervision in Chinese construction: Based on a simulation technology," Technological Forecasting and Social Change, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 1-9.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:tefoso:v:138:y:2019:i:c:p:1-9
    DOI: 10.1016/j.techfore.2018.10.016
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