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Laplace principle for large population games with control interaction

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  • Luo, Peng
  • Tangpi, Ludovic

Abstract

This work investigates continuous time stochastic differential games with a large number of players whose costs and dynamics interact through the empirical distribution of both their states and their controls. The control processes are assumed to be open-loop. We give regularity conditions guaranteeing that if the finite-player game admits a Nash equilibrium, then both the sequence of equilibria and the corresponding state processes satisfy a Sanov-type large deviation principle. The results require existence of a Lipschitz continuous solution of the master equation of the corresponding mean field game, and they carry over to cooperative (i.e. central planner) games. We study a linear-quadratic case of such games in details.

Suggested Citation

  • Luo, Peng & Tangpi, Ludovic, 2024. "Laplace principle for large population games with control interaction," Stochastic Processes and their Applications, Elsevier, vol. 171(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:spapps:v:171:y:2024:i:c:s0304414924000206
    DOI: 10.1016/j.spa.2024.104314
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Clémence Alasseur & Imen Ben Taher & Anis Matoussi, 2020. "An Extended Mean Field Game for Storage in Smart Grids," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 184(2), pages 644-670, February.
    2. Diogo Gomes & João Saúde, 2014. "Mean Field Games Models—A Brief Survey," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 110-154, June.
    3. Bensoussan, A. & Yam, S.C.P. & Zhang, Z., 2015. "Well-posedness of mean-field type forward–backward stochastic differential equations," Stochastic Processes and their Applications, Elsevier, vol. 125(9), pages 3327-3354.
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