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Going green: Framing effects in a dynamic coordination game

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  • Gerlagh, Reyer
  • van der Heijden, Eline

Abstract

We study decision-making in a (novel) dynamic coordination game that simulates ‘social tipping’. The game involves groups of three subjects who initially find themselves in a stable state with positive network externalities. Over seven rounds, they have the opportunity to transition to an alternative stable state with higher payoff, based on the other network. The transition is slow, costly and requires coordination to minimize costs.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerlagh, Reyer & van der Heijden, Eline, 2024. "Going green: Framing effects in a dynamic coordination game," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 108(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:soceco:v:108:y:2024:i:c:s221480432300174x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2023.102148
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cost of transition; Lab experiment; Dynamic stag hunt game; Framing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • O44 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - Environment and Growth

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