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Collective asset management under corporate governance theory

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  • Sun, Yang
  • Zhang, Yu
  • Tang, Xinwei

Abstract

The shareholding system for collective assets (SSCA) reform improves collective asset management with the help of corporate governance theory. This reform transforms collective asset management into a corporate governance structure subordinated to shareholders and the collectives' interests. Therefore, this reform can affect residents' disposable income and collective asset size. In this study, the time-varying Difference-in-Difference estimation model is used to examine the impact of the SSCA reform on collective asset size and residents' disposable income. This study shows that the SSCA reform is conducive to increasing residents' disposable income and expanding the size of collective assets. Further research shows that the SSCA reform can increase residents' disposable income by expanding the size of community dividends. The SSCA reform can expand the size of collective assets by reducing collective asset indebtedness.

Suggested Citation

  • Sun, Yang & Zhang, Yu & Tang, Xinwei, 2024. "Collective asset management under corporate governance theory," Research in International Business and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 67(PB).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:riibaf:v:67:y:2024:i:pb:s0275531923002635
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ribaf.2023.102137
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Reform of the shareholding system; Collective asset size; Residents' disposable income;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E65 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Studies of Particular Policy Episodes
    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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