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Stock market speculation and managerial myopia

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  • Nyman, Ingmar

Abstract

This paper extends the analysis of managerial share price concerns by allowing informed trading in the stock market. It is shown that because they decrease the manager's information advantage vis-à-vis the stock market, individual investors who trade on private information improve the efficiency of corporate investment. This improvement does, however, fall short of first-best efficiency. Moreover, a stronger managerial share-price concern increases the expected profit from informed trading. Hence, by encouraging individual investors to collect information about corporate decisions and trade on it, managerial myopia tends to automatically bring forth a partial solution to the problems that it causes.
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Suggested Citation

  • Nyman, Ingmar, 2005. "Stock market speculation and managerial myopia," Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 61-79.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:revfin:v:14:y:2005:i:1:p:61-79
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    2. Dobler, Michael, 2008. "Incentives for risk reporting -- A discretionary disclosure and cheap talk approach," The International Journal of Accounting, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 184-206.
    3. Anindya Chakrabarty & Anupam De & Gautam Bandyopadhyay, 2016. "Horizon heterogeneity, institutional constraint and managerial myopia: a multi-frequency perspective on ELSS," International Journal of Business Excellence, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 9(1), pages 18-47.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies

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