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Cash holding and over-investment behavior in firms with problem directors

Author

Listed:
  • Bhuiyan, Md Borhan Uddin
  • Hooks, Jill

Abstract

This paper examines the empirical relationship between cash holding and investment behavior when problem directors are on the Board. We argue that problem directors provide lower quality (weak) corporate governance which encourages excess cash holdings. The findings show consistent evidence that firms with at least one problem director hold more cash. In addition, evidence is found that firms with higher cash holdings engage in over-investment and such behavior is more pronounced when problem directors are on the board. This study contributes to the limited research on the professional history of directors and provides evidence of the financial effects for firms served by problem directors.

Suggested Citation

  • Bhuiyan, Md Borhan Uddin & Hooks, Jill, 2019. "Cash holding and over-investment behavior in firms with problem directors," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 35-51.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:61:y:2019:i:c:p:35-51
    DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2019.01.005
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Idrees Ali Shah & Syed Zulfiqar Ali Shah & Muhammad Nouman & Farman Ullah Khan & Daniel Badulescu & Laura-Mariana Cismas, 2021. "Corporate Governance and Cash Holding: New Insights from Concentrated and Competitive Industries," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(9), pages 1-17, April.
    2. Liu, Xingyu & Kok Loang, Ooi, 2023. "Analysts’ forecast optimism and cash holding: Evidence from China," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    3. Chang, Chong-Chuo & Yang, Han, 2022. "The role of cash holdings during financial crises," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    4. Zhang, Xiang & Zhan, Feng & Liu, Bin, 2023. "Institutional development, political uncertainty, and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 53(C).
    5. Berent Tomasz & Śniechowski Maciej, 2023. "Corporate sector cash holding – optimal levels, macro context, or external shocks?," International Journal of Management and Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of World Economy, vol. 59(4), pages 297-314, December.
    6. Chen, Wenrui & Liu, Xinghe & Hong, Yun, 2023. "Two heads better than one? Strategic alliance and firms excess cash holdings," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    7. Zhang, Xiang & Zhang, Zongyi & Zhou, Han, 2020. "Oil price uncertainty and cash holdings: Evidence from China," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    8. Kai Chang & Ning Lu & Ze Sheng Li & Yi Ran Wang, 2021. "The combined impacts of fiscal and credit policies on green firm's investment opportunity: Evidences from Chinese firm‐level analysis," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(7), pages 1822-1835, October.
    9. Yao, Youfu & Hong, Yun, 2023. "Can comment letters impact excess cash holdings? Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 900-922.
    10. Zhao, Yujie & Zhou, Donghua & Zhao, Kangsheng & Zhou, Ping, 2019. "Is the squeaky wheel getting the grease? Earnings management and government subsidies," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 297-312.
    11. Issal Haj-Salem & Khaled Hussainey, 2021. "Risk Disclosure and Corporate Cash Holdings," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(7), pages 1-15, July.
    12. Şirin Özlem & Omer Faruk Tan, 2022. "Predicting cash holdings using supervised machine learning algorithms," Financial Innovation, Springer;Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, vol. 8(1), pages 1-19, December.
    13. Chao, Ching-Hsiang & Huang, Chih-Jen & Ho, Ruey-Jenn & Huang, Hsin-Yi, 2022. "Catering to investors through capital expenditures: Testing assets substitution problem around financing," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    14. Farooq, Umar & Wen, Jun & Tabash, Mosab I. & Fadoul, Modawi, 2024. "Environmental regulations and capital investment: Does green innovation allow to grow?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 89(PA), pages 878-893.
    15. Guo, Chun & Su, Wunhong & Song, Xiaobao & Hu, Xingxing, 2022. "Heterogeneous debt financing and environmental research & development: Evidence from China," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 65-81.
    16. Ghafoor, Abdul & Zhichuan, Frank Li & Yousaf, Imran, 2024. "Co-opted Boards and Corporate Cash Holdings," CAFE Working Papers 27, Centre for Accountancy, Finance and Economics (CAFE), Birmingham City Business School, Birmingham City University.
    17. Shang, Duo & Yuan, Dongliang & Li, Dehui & Lin, Qi, 2023. "Independent directors’ geographic distance, high-speed railway, and corporate cash holdings," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 121(C).
    18. Bukalska Elżbieta & Maziarczyk Anna, 2023. "Impact of financial constraints and financial distress on cash holdings," International Journal of Management and Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of World Economy, vol. 59(1), pages 13-31, March.
    19. Chiu, Chun-Ju & Ho, Amy Yueh-Fang & Tsai, Li-Fang, 2022. "Effects of financial constraints and managerial overconfidence on investment-cash flow sensitivity," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 135-155.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Problem directors; Cash holdings; Over-investment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • M16 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - International Business Administration
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • G39 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Other

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