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The relationship between cash value and accounting conservatism: The role of controlling shareholders

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  • Lin, Cho-Min
  • Chan, Min-Lee
  • Chien, I-Hsin
  • Li, Kuan-Hua

Abstract

This paper analyzes the roles of controlling shareholders as either minority shareholder entrenchers or monitors in the relationship between conservative accounting practices and cash holding value. This issue is especially meaningful in countries such as Taiwan that have large numbers of firms with concentrated shareholdings. Consistent with the findings of Louis et al. (2012), our results indicate that accounting conservatism enhanced the value of cash holdings. In addition, our findings support both hypotheses H2a and H2b depending on the proportion of control-affiliated directors, agency problems, and financial crises. In general, the incentive effect of controlling shareholders, H2b, is supported at a relatively low proportion of control-affiliated directors, whereas the entrenchment effect of controlling shareholders, H2a, is confirmed at a relatively high proportion of control-affiliated directors. Moreover, the entrenchment effect is aggravated when a firm suffers a serious agency problem during a period of financial crisis. This study contributes to the current literature on the influence of accounting conservatism on cash value in the presence or absence of controlling shareholders.

Suggested Citation

  • Lin, Cho-Min & Chan, Min-Lee & Chien, I-Hsin & Li, Kuan-Hua, 2018. "The relationship between cash value and accounting conservatism: The role of controlling shareholders," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 233-245.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:55:y:2018:i:c:p:233-245
    DOI: 10.1016/j.iref.2017.07.017
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    3. Amneh Hamad* & Mohammad AL-Momani & Hamzah Al-Mawali, 2019. "Does Accounting Conservatism Mitigate the Operating Cash Flows Downside Risk?," The Journal of Social Sciences Research, Academic Research Publishing Group, vol. 5(2), pages 472-483, 02-2019.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Accounting conservatism; Value of cash holdings; Controlling shareholders;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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