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Income distribution and exchange in a dynamic search model

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  • Yilmaz, Ensar
  • Ünveren, Burak

Abstract

This paper studies the link between income distribution and trade mechanisms in a dynamic search model with two-sided asymmetric information. Buyers and sellers have imperfect information about the income levels of the other group. Furthermore, asymmetry of information about incomes is the source of price dispersion. In such a frictional environment, we capture the effects of a change in inter- and intra-class income distribution on the trade mechanism, which is represented by the expected trade volume and the flux of buyers and sellers in the market.

Suggested Citation

  • Yilmaz, Ensar & Ünveren, Burak, 2011. "Income distribution and exchange in a dynamic search model," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 665-678, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:20:y:2011:i:4:p:665-678
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    References listed on IDEAS

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