Impact analysis of the four-party evolutionary game in renewable portfolio standard under dynamic parameters

Renewable portfolio standard has become the primary policy tool to improve the integration of renewable energy. The motivation of the parties involved and the formulation of the policy parameters are crucial for the rapid development of renewable energy industry. However, the role of large consumers has often been neglected as the main party for renewable energy consumption, and the policy parameters have been dominated by static parameters. This paper innovatively introduces large consumers into the evolutionary game, constructs a four-party revenue matrix and the replicated dynamic equations, analyzes the equilibrium conditions of the evolutionary game, and constructs the functions of the key dynamic parameters over time, then simulates the behavioral strategies of the game players under the dynamic parameters with a system dynamics model. The optimal strategy is regulators waive regulation, while power plants, large consumers and power sales companies fulfill their quotas. Dynamic fines, dynamic quotas, and dynamic consumption prices have a large impact on each player, while dynamic TGC prices have a limited impact on them. Reasonably high fines in the initial stage are effective in facilitating each player to its stable state more quickly than static fines. Even if the fine is reduced in the later stages, it will not affect their strategies. High quotas and low consumption prices will significantly accelerate the exit of regulators from regulation, while power sales companies and large consumers will quickly fulfill their quota tasks. Only power generators prefer low quotas and high consumption prices. These results provide some recommendations for the setting of policy parameters.