A game-theoretic approach to the division of profits from economic land development
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- Berliant, M. & Ten Raa, T., 2003. "Increasing returns to scale and perfect competition : The role of land," Other publications TiSEM c4f1929e-6651-4959-b757-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Roy Chowdhury, Prabal & Sengupta, Kunal, 2012.
"Transparency, complementarity and holdout,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 598-612.
- Roy Chowdhury, Prabal & Sengupta, Kunal, 2009. "Transparency, complementarity and holdout," MPRA Paper 17606, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Prabal Roy Chowdhury & Kunal Sengupta, 2010. "Transparency, Complementarity and Holdout," Monash Economics Working Papers 49-10, Monash University, Department of Economics.
- Berliant, Marcus & ten Raa, Thijs, 2003.
"Increasing returns and perfect competition: the role of land,"
Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 339-367, September.
- Berliant, M. & Ten Raa, T., 1997. "Increasing returns and perfect competition : The role of land," Other publications TiSEM fa9524e8-1b4e-4b63-810f-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Berliant, M. & Ten Raa, T., 1997. "Increasing returns and perfect competition : The role of land," Discussion Paper 1997-75, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Deman, S., 2000. "The real estate takeover: Application of Grossman and Hart theory," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 175-195.
- Flavio Menzies & Rohan Pitchford, 2002. "Chasing Patents," International and Development Economics Working Papers idec02-3, International and Development Economics.
- Menezes, Flavio & Pitchford, Rohan, 2004.
"The land assembly problem revisited,"
Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 155-162, March.
- Menezes, Flavio Marques & Pitchford, Rohan, 2001. "The land assembly problem revisited," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 427, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
- Sreeparna Saha & Prabal Roy Chowdhury & Jaideep Roy & Prasad Bhattarcharya, 2016. "Political Economy of Land Acquisition and Holdout," Discussion Papers 16-07, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
- Soumendu Sarkar & Dhritiman Gupta, 2023.
"Bargaining for assembly,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 95(2), pages 229-254, August.
- Soumendu Sarkar & Dhritiman Gupta, 2022. "Bargaining for Assembly," Working papers 319, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Soumendu Sarkar, 2022. "Strategyproof and Budget Balanced Mechanisms for Assembly," Working papers 320, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Prabal Roy Chowdhury & Kunal Sengupta, 2008. "Multi-person bargaining with complementarity: Is there holdout?," Discussion Papers 08-10, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
- Florenz Plassmann & T. Nicolaus Tideman, 2007. "Efficient Urban Renewal Without Takings: Two Solutions to the Land Assembly Problem," Working Papers e07-8, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics.
- Andree Ehlert & Thomas Wein & Peter Zweifel, 2017. "Overcoming resistance against managed care – insights from a bargaining model," Health Economics Review, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 1-15, December.
- Asaf Friedman Arch, 2014. "Sustainable Urban Renewal: The Tel Aviv Dilemma," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 6(5), pages 1-11, April.
- Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, 2014. "Opportunism in Sequential Investment Settings: On Holdups and Holdouts," Working papers 2014-08, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Roy Chowdhury, Prabal & Sengupta, Kunal, 2008. "Multi-person Bargaining With Complementarity: Is There Holdout?," MPRA Paper 11517, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jana, Arnab & Basu, Rounaq & Mukherjee, Conan, 2020. "A game theoretic approach to optimize multi-stakeholder utilities for land acquisition negotiations with informality," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
- Dick M. Carpenter II & John K. Ross, 2010. "Do Restrictions on Eminent Domain Harm Economic Development?," Economic Development Quarterly, , vol. 24(4), pages 337-351, November.
- Menezes, Flavio Marques & Pitchford, Rohan, 2001. "Chasing patents," FGV EPGE Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 411, EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance - FGV EPGE (Brazil).
- Göller, Daniel & Hewer, Michael, 2015. "Breakdown in multilateral negotiations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 478-484.
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