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Two-dimensional screening: a case of monopoly regulation

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  • Brighi, Luigi
  • D'Amato, Marcello

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  • Brighi, Luigi & D'Amato, Marcello, 2002. "Two-dimensional screening: a case of monopoly regulation," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 251-264, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:56:y:2002:i:3:p:251-264
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jullien, Bruno, 2000. "Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection Models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 1-47, July.
    2. Baron, David P & Myerson, Roger B, 1982. "Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 911-930, July.
    3. David S. Sibley & Padmanabhan Srinagesh, 1997. "Multiproduct Nonlinear Pricing with Multiple Taste Characteristics," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(4), pages 684-707, Winter.
    4. Dana Jr. James D., 1993. "The Organization and Scope of Agents: Regulating Multiproduct Industries," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 288-310, April.
    5. Armstrong, Mark & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1999. "Multi-dimensional screening:: A user's guide," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 959-979, April.
    6. A. Michael Spence, 1980. "Multi-Product Quantity-Dependent Prices and Profitability Constraints," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 47(5), pages 821-841.
    7. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1989. "Countervailing incentives in agency problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 294-313, December.
    8. Maggi G. & Rodriguez-Clare A., 1995. "On Countervailing Incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 238-263, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ana Pinto Borges & Didier Laussel & João Correia-da-Silva, 2013. "Multidimensional Screening with Complementary Activities: Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Cost and Unknown Preference for Empire Building," Games, MDPI, vol. 4(3), pages 1-29, September.
    2. Wang, Li & Zhang, Xin-Hua & Zhang, Yue-Jun, 2023. "Designing the pricing mechanism of residents’ self-selection sales electricity based on household size," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 860-878.

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