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The behaviour of bidders in quantitative-easing auctions of sovereign bonds in Japan: Determinants of the popularity of the 9 to 10-year maturity segment

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  • Inaba, Kei-Ichiro

Abstract

This article provides Japanese evidence on how bidders behaved in multiple-object, multiple-unit, discriminatory-price auctions. It does so by analysing the popularity of the 9 to 10-year maturity segment in the Bank of Japan’s auction purchases of government bonds with remaining maturities of 5–10 years over the period 2013–2015 in its Quantitative Easing policy. The popularity had five determinants: (i) a morning-market factor, the relative interest-rate changes in the morning for the 10-year maturity length compared to 5 to 9-year maturity lengths, (ii) a volatility factor, the relative volatility of 10-year interest rates compared to the other maturity lengths, (iii) a yield-curve factor, the relative value of 10-year interest rates compared to 7-year ones, (iv) a market-liquidity factor, the relative liquidity level for current 10-year government bonds compared to those with 7-year remaining maturity, and (v) a scarcity factor, the size of the auctions relative to the amount of marketable government bonds in the 9 to 10-year maturity segment. The popularity also co-integrated with the five factors, amongst which the yield-curve factor was the most powerful in explaining the popularity’s long-term equilibria. It took three auctions for the popularity to reach a new equilibrium, after diverting by five percentage points from its long-term equilibrium. The morning-market factor was the greatest source of unexpected changes in the popularity.

Suggested Citation

  • Inaba, Kei-Ichiro, 2019. "The behaviour of bidders in quantitative-easing auctions of sovereign bonds in Japan: Determinants of the popularity of the 9 to 10-year maturity segment," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 206-214.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:quaeco:v:72:y:2019:i:c:p:206-214
    DOI: 10.1016/j.qref.2018.12.008
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    1. Inaba, Kei-Ichiro, 2020. "Japan’s impactful augmentation of quantitative easing sovereign-bond purchases," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auction; Bank of Japan; Quantitative easing; Long-term interest rates; Japanese government bonds;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G13 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing

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