First price auctions with entry: An experimental investigation
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Cited by:
- Sheremeta, Roman M., 2010.
"Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 731-747, March.
- Sheremeta, Roman, 2009. "Experimental Comparison of Multi-Stage and One-Stage Contests," MPRA Paper 49884, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Roman M. Sheremeta, 2009. "Experimental Comparison of Multi-Stage and One-Stage Contests," Working Papers 09-04, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
- Ketel, Nadine & Linde, Jona & Oosterbeek, Hessel & van der Klaauw, Bas, 2014.
"Tuition Fees as a Commitment Device,"
IZA Discussion Papers
7951, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Oosterbeek, Hessel & van der Klaauw, Bas & Ketel, Nadine & Linde, Jona, 2014. "Tuition fees as a commitment device," CEPR Discussion Papers 9862, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Sheremeta, Roman, 2009. "Essays on Experimental Investigation of Lottery Contests," MPRA Paper 49888, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Drake, Samielle & Xu, Fei, 2023. "Regulation and Competition in Public Procurement," Umeå Economic Studies 1013, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
- Daniel Friedman & Kai Pommerenke & Rajan Lukose & Garrett Milam & Bernardo Huberman, 2007.
"Searching for the sunk cost fallacy,"
Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(1), pages 79-104, March.
- Daniel Friedman & Kai Pommerenke & Rajan Lukose & Garret Milam & Bernardo A. Huberman, 2004. "Searching for the Sunk Cost Fallacy," Experimental 0407008, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Daniel Friedman & Kai Pommerenke & Rajan Lukose & Garret Milam & Bernardo A. Huberman, 2004. "Searching for the Sunk Cost Fallacy," Experimental 0407007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Constantinos Daskalakis & Maxwell Fishelson & Brendan Lucier & Vasilis Syrgkanis & Santhoshini Velusamy, 2020. "Multi-item Non-truthful Auctions Achieve Good Revenue," Papers 2002.06702, arXiv.org, revised Sep 2022.
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