Costly transparency
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.08.007
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- Fehrler, Sebastian & Hughes, Niall, 2015. "How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation : Theory and Experiment," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1088, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
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- John Duggan & Cesar Martinelli, 2015. "The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: A Survey and Some New Results," Working Papers 1056, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
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100440, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
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- Hughes, Niall E & Fehrler, Sebastian, 2015. "How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1057, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Fehrler, Sebastian & Hughes, Niall, 2015. "How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation : Theory and Experiment," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1088, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Gratton, Gabriele, 2015. "The sound of silence: Political accountability and libel law," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 266-279.
- De Moragas, Antoni-Italo, 2022. "Disclosing decision makers’ private interests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 150(C).
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Keywords
Transparency; Reputation; Herding; Principal-agent; Welfare;All these keywords.
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