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Precautionary savings and the governance of nonprofit organizations

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  • Fisman, Raymond
  • Glenn Hubbard, R.

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  • Fisman, Raymond & Glenn Hubbard, R., 2005. "Precautionary savings and the governance of nonprofit organizations," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(11-12), pages 2231-2243, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:89:y:2005:i:11-12:p:2231-2243
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Shleifer, Andrei & Wolfenzon, Daniel, 2002. "Investor protection and equity markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 3-27, October.
    2. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 2000. "Investor protection and corporate governance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 3-27.
    3. Raymond Fisman & R. Glenn Hubbard, 2003. "The Role of Nonprofit Endowments," NBER Chapters, in: The Governance of Not-for-Profit Organizations, pages 217-234, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    5. Edward L. Glaeser, 2003. "The Governance of Not-for-Profit Organizations," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number glae03-1.
    6. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    7. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2001. "Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 116(3), pages 901-932.
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    Cited by:

    1. Joseph Hughes, 2013. "A New Cost Efficiency Measure for Not-for-Profit Firms: Evidence of a Link Between Inefficiency and Large Endowments," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 41(3), pages 279-300, September.
    2. Jordan van Rijn & Shuwei Zeng & Brent Hueth, 2023. "Do credit unions have distinct objectives? Evidence from executive compensation structures," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 94(1), pages 5-38, March.
    3. Wellens, Lore & Jegers, Marc, 2014. "Effective governance in nonprofit organizations: A literature based multiple stakeholder approach," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 223-243.
    4. John Bennett & Elisabetta Iossa & Gabriella Legrenzi, 2010. "Commercial Activity As Insurance: The Investment Behaviour Of Non‐Profit Organizations," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 81(3), pages 445-465, September.
    5. Gani Aldashev & Esteban Jaimovich & Thierry Verdier, 2018. "Small is Beautiful: Motivational Allocation in the Nonprofit Sector," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 16(3), pages 730-780.
    6. David Adeabah & Charles Andoh & Simplice A. Asongu & Isaac Akomea-Frimpong, 2021. "Elections, Political Connections and Cash Holdings: Evidence from Local Assemblies," Working Papers of the African Governance and Development Institute. 21/004, African Governance and Development Institute..
    7. Laudo Ogura & David T Yi, 2015. "Determinants of saving in U.S. nonprofit organizations," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 35(4), pages 2786-2795.
    8. Newton, Ashley N., 2015. "Executive compensation, organizational performance, and governance quality in the absence of owners," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 195-222.
    9. Brickley, James A. & Van Horn, R. Lawrence & Wedig, Gerard J., 2010. "Board composition and nonprofit conduct: Evidence from hospitals," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 196-208, November.
    10. S. Verbruggen & J. Christiaens, 2010. "Earnings Management in Nonprofit Organizations: Does Governmental Financing Play a Role?," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 10/665, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
    11. Andres Ramirez, 2011. "Nonprofit Cash Holdings," Public Finance Review, , vol. 39(5), pages 653-681, September.
    12. Steven Balsam & Erica E. Harris, 2018. "Nonprofit executive incentive pay," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 1665-1714, December.
    13. Verdier, Thierry & Aldashev, Gani & Jaimovich, Esteban, 2014. "When warm glow burns: Motivational (mis)allocation in the non-profit sector," CEPR Discussion Papers 9963, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    14. Andrew R. Finley & Curtis Hall & Erica Harris & Stephen J. Lusch, 2021. "The Effect of Large Corporate Donors on Non-profit Performance," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 172(3), pages 463-485, September.
    15. Bae, Kee-Hong & Kim, Seung-Bo & Kim, Woochan, 2012. "Family control and expropriation at not-for-profit organizations: evidence from korean private universities," MPRA Paper 44029, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Thornton, Jeremy, 2010. "Explaining unrestricted giving by charitable foundations: A transaction cost approach," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 44-53, January.
    17. Chen, Yangyang & Murgulov, Zoltan & Rhee, S. Ghon & Veeraraghavan, Madhu, 2016. "Religious beliefs and local government financing, investment, and cash holding decisions," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(PA), pages 258-271.

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