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Courts, Crime and Economic Performance: Evidence from a Judicial Reform in Kenya

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  • Chemin, Matthieu
  • Kimalu, Paul
  • Newman-Bachand, Simon

Abstract

The rule of law affects crime, and crime is an important obstacle to business in developing countries. In this paper, we study a criminal judicial reform aimed at increasing the speed of courts. In this reform called Active Case Management (ACM), judges are instructed to take more active control of their cases by organizing pre-trial conferences and setting up deadlines with the overall objective of reducing adjournments; i.e., postponements of hearings to later dates. Importantly, the reform was implemented only in some pilot courts, selected in a plausibly exogenous way. We employ a triple difference analysis, comparing the time to disposition of criminal cases versus civil cases, in treated courts versus control courts, for cases filed before and after the reform. We find an increase in the speed of courts. The quality of legal processes improves. More cases get completed. Crime reduces in the treated areas in the long run. Firms respond by spending less on protection against crime which affects their operations.

Suggested Citation

  • Chemin, Matthieu & Kimalu, Paul & Newman-Bachand, Simon, 2024. "Courts, Crime and Economic Performance: Evidence from a Judicial Reform in Kenya," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 231(C).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:231:y:2024:i:c:s0047272723002177
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.105035
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    References listed on IDEAS

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