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The Impact of Presidential Appointment of Judges: Montesquieu or the Federalists?

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  • Sultan Mehmood

Abstract

A central question in development economics is whether there are adequate checks and balances on the executive. This paper provides causal evidence of how increasing constraints on the executive—via removal of presidential discretion in judicial appointments—promotes the rule of law. The age structure of judges at the time of the reform and the mandatory retirement age law provide us with an exogenous source of variation in the termination of presidential discretion in judicial appointments. Overall, the results indicate that presidential appointment of judges deteriorates the rule of law. Even one degree of separation between the judiciary and the president matters.

Suggested Citation

  • Sultan Mehmood, 2022. "The Impact of Presidential Appointment of Judges: Montesquieu or the Federalists?," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 411-445, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aejapp:v:14:y:2022:i:4:p:411-45
    DOI: 10.1257/app.20210176
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sultan Mehmood & Bakhtawar Ali, 2024. "Judicial Capture," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 134(659), pages 1287-1301.
    2. Zhao, Da & Guo, Jingyuan & Yu, Shule & Yu, Litian, 2024. "Tradeoff between local protection and public sector performance: Lessons from judicial fiscal centralization," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 220(C), pages 254-278.
    3. Gulzar, Saad & Khan, Muhammad Yasir, 2021. ""Good Politicians'': Experimental Evidence on Motivations for Political Candidacy and Government Performance," SocArXiv z9d3f, Center for Open Science.
    4. Philipp Barteska & Jay Euijung Lee, 2024. "Bureaucrats and the Korean export miracle," Discussion Papers 2024-11, Nottingham Interdisciplinary Centre for Economic and Political Research (NICEP).
    5. Chemin, Matthieu & Chen, Daniel L. & Di Maro, Vincenzo & Kimalu, Paul & Mokaya, Momanyi & Ramos-Maqueda, Manuel, 2022. "Data Science for Justice: The Short-Term Effects of a Randomized Judicial Reform in Kenya," TSE Working Papers 22-1391, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    6. Itai Ater & Itzchak Tzachi Raz & Yannay Spitzer, 2023. "The Economic Consequences Of Democratic Backsliding Israel'S Judicial Overhaul," Israel Economic Review, Bank of Israel, vol. 21(2), pages 77-138, December.
    7. Lambais, Guilherme & Sigstad, Henrik, 2023. "Judicial subversion: The effects of political power on court outcomes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 217(C).
    8. Chemin, Matthieu & Kimalu, Paul & Newman-Bachand, Simon, 2024. "Courts, Crime and Economic Performance: Evidence from a Judicial Reform in Kenya," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 231(C).

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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