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Court-packing and judicial manipulation

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  • Callais, Justin T.
  • Mkrtchian, Gor

Abstract

Judicial independence is a fundamental pillar of a liberal democracy. In one of its most basic functions, judicial independence impedes the ability to engage in executive overreach. Judicial manipulation, particularly the infamous practice of court-packing, threatens this pillar. Court-packing and other forms of judicial manipulation can exacerbate executive corruption and worsen government accountability and the rule of law. Using synthetic control analyses, we examine three countries (Hungary, Poland, and Turkey) that recently implemented waves of judicial manipulation that included outright court-packing. Our results provide evidence that in every case, executive corruption worsens and scores on accountability and rule of law decrease relative to the counterfactual. Furthermore, the gap between the de jure constitutional provisions and the actual de facto practice of those provisions (constitutional compliance) widens. In each case, these results are large in magnitude and almost always statistically significant.

Suggested Citation

  • Callais, Justin T. & Mkrtchian, Gor, 2024. "Court-packing and judicial manipulation," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 83(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:83:y:2024:i:c:s0176268024000387
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102536
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    References listed on IDEAS

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