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When do more selfish politicians manipulate less, not more?

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  • Wang, Xue
  • Bohn, Frank
  • Veiga, Francisco José

Abstract

We model the political manipulation of deficits in a political budget cycle model. Assuming that a share of voters suffers from debt illusion the incumbent can increase her re-election chances by expanding government spending. However, the optimal manipulation may exceed the amount necessary to maximize re-election chances (over-manipulation) if the deficit is not very costly (low repayment obligation). Then, more selfish politicians (higher ego rents and, therefore, increased re-election motivation) reduce the over-manipulation. Conversely, “excessive” spending may wrongly be interpreted as opportunistic government manipulation. Theoretical results are supported empirically, with very robust evidence in a sample of 87 democracies.

Suggested Citation

  • Wang, Xue & Bohn, Frank & Veiga, Francisco José, 2023. "When do more selfish politicians manipulate less, not more?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:77:y:2023:i:c:s0176268022001239
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102320
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political budget cycles; Debt illusion; Ego rent; Deficit; Fiscal policy; Political economy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus

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