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Financial market lobbies and pension reform

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  • Kemmerling, Achim
  • Neugart, Michael

Abstract

We develop a model in which firms in the financial market lobby the government to lower compulsory contributions to the public pension system. Firms lobby in order to increase demand from households for their old-age savings products. We conclude with a comparison of two major pension reforms in Europe exemplifying the influence of financial market lobbies on pension policies.

Suggested Citation

  • Kemmerling, Achim & Neugart, Michael, 2009. "Financial market lobbies and pension reform," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 163-173, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:25:y:2009:i:2:p:163-173
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    1. repec:zbw:rwirep:0170 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Niklas Potrafke, 2012. "Is German domestic social policy politically controversial?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 153(3), pages 393-418, December.
    3. Corneo, Giacomo & Keese, Matthias & Schröder, Carsten, 2010. "The effect of saving subsidies on household saving: Evidence from Germany," Discussion Papers 2010/3, Free University Berlin, School of Business & Economics.
    4. Hollanders, D.A. & Vis, B., 2009. "Voters' Commitment Problem and Welfare-Program Reforms," Discussion Paper 2009-93, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    5. Arjen van der Heide & Sebastian Kohl, 2024. "Private Insurance, Public Welfare, and Financial Markets: Alpine and Maritime Countries in Comparative-Historical Perspective," Politics & Society, , vol. 52(2), pages 268-303, June.
    6. Achim Kemmerling & Michael Neugart, 2019. "Redistributive pensions in the developing world," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(2), pages 702-726, May.
    7. Giacomo Corneo & Matthias Keese & Carsten Schröder, 2010. "The Eff ect of Saving Subsidies on Household Saving – Evidence from Germanys," Ruhr Economic Papers 0170, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
    8. Du, C. & Muysken, J. & Sleijpen, O.C.H.M., 2010. "Economy wide risk diversification in a three-pillar pension system," Research Memorandum 055, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    9. Neugart, Michael & Kemmerling, Achim, 2015. "The emergence of redistributive pensions in the developing world," VfS Annual Conference 2015 (Muenster): Economic Development - Theory and Policy 112884, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    10. Neyapti, Bilin, 2013. "Modeling institutional evolution," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 1-16.
    11. Hollanders, D.A. & Vis, B., 2009. "Voters' Commitment Problem and Welfare-Program Reforms," Other publications TiSEM b07d1e30-5614-415f-b1a0-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.

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