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The political economy of the subprime crisis: Why subprime was so attractive to its creators

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  • Swan, Peter L.

Abstract

Examination of the origins of the 2008 subprime crisis reveals that what occurred was no accident. All the major parties responsible for the crisis appear to have gained something from what transpired, at least in the short-run. Moreover, it seems to have been as much, if not more, a failure of government and its agencies inclusive of regulators as much as any failure of capitalism. Finally, the apparently arbitrary, if not self-interested, bank bailouts seem to indicate that governments are likely to directing bank policy for some time.

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  • Swan, Peter L., 2009. "The political economy of the subprime crisis: Why subprime was so attractive to its creators," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 124-132, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:25:y:2009:i:1:p:124-132
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Foote, Christopher L. & Gerardi, Kristopher & Goette, Lorenz & Willen, Paul S., 2008. "Just the facts: An initial analysis of subprime's role in the housing crisis," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 291-305, December.
    2. Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, 2011. "Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(6), pages 1848-1880.
    3. Danis, Michelle A. & Pennington-Cross, Anthony, 2008. "The delinquency of subprime mortgages," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 60(1-2), pages 67-90.
    4. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, 2010. "The Political Economy of the US Mortgage Default Crisis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 1967-1998, December.
    5. Ashcraft, Adam B. & Schuermann, Til, 2008. "Understanding the Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 2(3), pages 191-309, June.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Shanuka Senarath & Pelma Rajapakse & Jan Job de Vries Robbé & Naveen Wickremeratne & Maduka Subasinghage, 2022. "Being Naked - et Quo hinc ?: Developing a ‘Skin-in-the-Game’ Solution for Credit Default Swaps," IJFS, MDPI, vol. 10(4), pages 1-14, October.
    3. Fricke, Daniel, 2010. "Contagion between European and US banks: Evidence from equity prices," Kiel Working Papers 1667, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    4. Robert E. Prasch, 2010. "Bankers Gone Wild: The Crash of 2008," Chapters, in: Steven Kates (ed.), Macroeconomic Theory and its Failings, chapter 11, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Katsimi, Margarita & Moutos, Thomas, 2010. "EMU and the Greek crisis: The political-economy perspective," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 568-576, December.
    6. Woon Sau Leung & Nicholas Taylor, 2013. "Testing for contagion: the impact of US structured markets on international financial markets," Chapters, in: Adrian R. Bell & Chris Brooks & Marcel Prokopczuk (ed.), Handbook of Research Methods and Applications in Empirical Finance, chapter 11, pages 256-284, Edward Elgar Publishing.

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