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Trade protection to reduce redistribution

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  • Glazer, Amihai
  • Ranjan, Priya

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  • Glazer, Amihai & Ranjan, Priya, 2007. "Trade protection to reduce redistribution," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 790-805, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:23:y:2007:i:3:p:790-805
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    2. Devashish Mitra, 2016. "On The Endogenous Choice Between Protection And Promotion," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Trade Policy Theory, Evidence and Applications, chapter 11, pages 201-219, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Daron Acemoglu, 2006. "Modeling Inefficient Institutions," NBER Working Papers 11940, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    5. Wolfgang Mayer & Raymond Riezman, 2013. "Voter Preferences for Trade Policy Instruments," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Raymond Riezman (ed.), International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 11, pages 169-183, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    6. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2001. "A Theory of Political Transitions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 938-963, September.
    7. Mayer, Wolfgang & Riezman, Raymond G., 1987. "Endogenous choice of trade policy instruments," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 377-381, November.
    8. Staiger, Robert W. & Tabellini, Guido, 1989. "Rules and discretion in trade policy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1265-1277, July.
    9. Wolfgang Mayer & Raymond Riezman, 1989. "Tariff Formation In A Multidimensional Voting Model," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 61-79, March.
    10. Cassing, James H & Hillman, Arye L, 1986. "Shifting Comparative Advantage and Senescent Industry Collapse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 516-523, June.
    11. Neil Bruce & Michael Waldman, 1990. "The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(1), pages 155-165.
    12. Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Policy uncertainty and private investment in developing countries," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 229-242, October.
    13. Julio J. Rotemberg, 2003. "Commercial Policy with Altruistic Voters," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(1), pages 174-201, February.
    14. Rodrik, Dani, 1995. "Political economy of trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 28, pages 1457-1494, Elsevier.
    15. Staiger, Robert W & Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Discretionary Trade Policy and Excessive Protection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 823-837, December.
    16. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
    17. Lindbeck, Assar & Weibull, Jorgen W, 1988. "Altruism and Time Consistency: The Economics of Fait Accompli," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(6), pages 1165-1182, December.
    18. Coate, Stephen & Morris, Stephen, 1995. "On the Form of Transfers in Special Interests," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1210-1235, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Madalina-Gabriela ANGHEL & Radu Titus MARINESCU & Aurelian DIACONU & Gyorgy BODO, 2017. "Analysis of the evolution of turnover in wholesale and retail," Romanian Statistical Review Supplement, Romanian Statistical Review, vol. 65(3), pages 63-75, March.
    2. Do, Quy-Toan & Levchenko, Andrei A., 2017. "Trade policy and redistribution when preferences are non-homothetic," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 92-95.

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