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The social cost of monopoly when consumers resist

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  • Keem, Jung Hoon

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  • Keem, Jung Hoon, 2001. "The social cost of monopoly when consumers resist," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 633-639, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:17:y:2001:i:3:p:633-639
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    1. Tore Ellingsen, 2008. "Strategic Buyers and the Social Cost of Monopoly," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 399-408, Springer.
    2. Fabella, Raul V., 1995. "The social cost of rent seeking under countervailing opposition to distortionary transfers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 235-247, June.
    3. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, March.
    4. Nti, Kofi O, 1999. "Rent-Seeking with Asymmetric Valuations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 98(3-4), pages 415-430, March.
    5. Torsten Schmidt, 1992. "Rent‐Seeking Firms And Consumers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(2), pages 137-149, July.
    6. Baik, Kyung Hwan, 1999. "Rent-Seeking Firms, Consumer Groups, and the Social Costs of Monopoly," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 37(3), pages 541-553, July.
    7. Wenders, John T, 1987. "On Perfect Rent Dissipation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 456-459, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gumus, Erdal, 2006. "The Social Costs of Monopoly: A Survey And An Evaluation," MPRA Paper 42107, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Epstein, Gil S. & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2003. "The social cost of rent seeking when consumer opposition influences monopoly behavior," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 61-69, March.
    3. Konrad, Kai A., 2007. "Strategy in contests: an introduction [Strategie in Turnieren – eine Einführung]," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2007-01, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    4. Tamer Çetin & Fuat Oğuz, 2010. "The Effects Of Economic Regulation In The Istanbul Taxicab Market," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(3), pages 59-64, October.

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