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Efficient resource distribution in a minority game with a biased pool of strategies

Author

Listed:
  • Yip, K.F.
  • Hui, P.M.
  • Lo, T.S.
  • Johnson, N.F.

Abstract

The minority game (MG) is an agent-based model of a competing population with limited resources. We propose and study a modified model based on the MG in which the pool of strategies is biased, i.e., some strategies are more often picked by agents than others. It is found that the fluctuation in the number of agents making a particular choice over time is suppressed in the crowded phase of the MG when a bias is imposed. The suppressed fluctuation is related to the more effective formation of crowd and anticrowd. Accompanying the suppressed fluctuation is an enhanced success rate among the agents and thus a more efficient distribution of resources in a population of intrinsically selfish agents. The effect of biasing the strategies is also studied within the context of strategy-play among the agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Yip, K.F. & Hui, P.M. & Lo, T.S. & Johnson, N.F., 2003. "Efficient resource distribution in a minority game with a biased pool of strategies," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 321(1), pages 318-324.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:phsmap:v:321:y:2003:i:1:p:318-324
    DOI: 10.1016/S0378-4371(02)01795-8
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    Cited by:

    1. Lustosa, Bernardo C. & Cajueiro, Daniel O., 2010. "Constrained information minority game: How was the night at El Farol?," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 389(6), pages 1230-1238.
    2. Linde, Jona & Sonnemans, Joep & Tuinstra, Jan, 2014. "Strategies and evolution in the minority game: A multi-round strategy experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 77-95.

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    Keywords

    Agent-based models; Econophysics;

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