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Government borrowing using bonds with randomly determined returns: Welfare improving randomization in the context of deficit finance

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  • Smith, Bruce D.
  • Villamil, Anne P.

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  • Smith, Bruce D. & Villamil, Anne P., 1998. "Government borrowing using bonds with randomly determined returns: Welfare improving randomization in the context of deficit finance," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 351-370, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:41:y:1998:i:2:p:351-370
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    1. Richard Arnott & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1988. "Randomization with Asymmetric Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(3), pages 344-362, Autumn.
    2. Bencivenga, Valerie R & Smith, Bruce D, 1992. "Deficits, Inflation, and the Banking System in Developing Countries: The Optimal Degree of Financial Repression," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(4), pages 767-790, October.
    3. Weir, David R., 1989. "Tontines, Public Finance, and Revolution in France and England, 1688–1789," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(1), pages 95-124, March.
    4. John Bryant & Neil Wallace, 1984. "A Price Discrimination Analysis of Monetary Policy," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 51(2), pages 279-288.
    5. Prescott, Edward C & Townsend, Robert M, 1984. "Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 21-45, January.
    6. Mirrless, J. A., 1975. "Optimal commodity taxation in a two-class economy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 27-33, February.
    7. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March.
    8. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
    9. Clotfelter, Charles T & Cook, Philip J, 1990. "On the Economics of State Lotteries," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 105-119, Fall.
    10. Villamil, Anne P., 1988. "Price discriminating monetary policy : A nonuniform pricing approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 385-392, April.
    11. Cooley, Thomas F & Smith, Bruce D, 1993. "A Theory of Optimal Denominations for Government Liabilities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(4), pages 597-623, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Mauro Guillén & Adrian Tschoegl, 2002. "Banking on Gambling: Banks and Lottery-Linked Deposit Accounts," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 21(3), pages 219-231, June.
    2. Gottardi, Piero, 1995. "Does sunspot monetary policy matter?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 47(3-4), pages 297-303, March.
    3. Stephanie Bell, 1999. "Functional Finance: What, Why, and How?," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_287, Levy Economics Institute.
    4. Christian RIETSCH, 2020. "La tontine mort-née de 1714," LEO Working Papers / DR LEO 2809, Orleans Economics Laboratory / Laboratoire d'Economie d'Orleans (LEO), University of Orleans.
    5. Stacey Schreft & Bruce Smith, 2008. "The social value of risk-free government debt," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 131-155, March.

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