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Bankruptcy and the per capita nucleolus: The claim-and-right rules family

Author

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  • Huijink, S.
  • Borm, P.E.M.
  • Kleppe, J.
  • Reijnierse, J.H.

Abstract

This article describes the per capita nucleolus for bankruptcy games as a bankruptcy rule. This rule, called the clights rule, is based on the well-known constrained equal awards principle and it takes into account a vector of clights, a new term which is a blend of claims and rights. These clights only depend on the vector of claims while the height of the estate determines whether the clights should be interpreted as modified claims or as rights. It is shown that both the clights rule and the Aumann–Maschler rule can be captured within the family of so-called claim-and-right rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Huijink, S. & Borm, P.E.M. & Kleppe, J. & Reijnierse, J.H., 2015. "Bankruptcy and the per capita nucleolus: The claim-and-right rules family," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 15-31.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:77:y:2015:i:c:p:15-31
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.06.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. William Thomson, 2008. "Two families of rules for the adjudication of conflicting claims," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 31(4), pages 667-692, December.
    2. Juan Moreno-Ternero & Antonio Villar, 2006. "The TAL-Family of Rules for Bankruptcy Problems," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 27(2), pages 231-249, October.
    3. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
    4. SCHMEIDLER, David, 1969. "The nucleolus of a characteristic function game," LIDAM Reprints CORE 44, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    5. Groote Schaarsberg, M. & Borm, P.E.M. & Hamers, H.J.M. & Reijnierse, J.H., 2012. "Interactive Purchasing Situations," Discussion Paper 2012-035, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    6. Aumann, Robert J. & Maschler, Michael, 1985. "Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 195-213, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. René Brink & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2017. "The reverse TAL-family of rules for bankruptcy problems," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 254(1), pages 449-465, July.
    2. Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2017. "A Talmudic Approach to Bankruptcy Problems," Working Papers 17.01, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
    3. Dongshuang Hou & Aymeric Lardon & Panfei Sun & Theo Driessen, 2018. "Compromise for the per Capita Complaint: an optimization CharaCterization of two equalitarian values," Working Papers halshs-01931224, HAL.
    4. Arin Aguirre, Francisco Javier & Katsev, Ilya, 2016. "The SD-prekernel for TU games," IKERLANAK info:eu-repo/grantAgreeme, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.

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