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The approximation of a strong perfect equilibrium in a discounted supergame

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  • Horniacek, Milan

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  • Horniacek, Milan, 1996. "The approximation of a strong perfect equilibrium in a discounted supergame," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 85-107.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:mateco:v:25:y:1996:i:1:p:85-107
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    1. van Damme, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation-proof equilibria in repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 206-217, February.
    2. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
    3. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December.
    5. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Zhonghao SHUI, 2020. "Degree-K subgame perfect Nash equilibria and the folk theorem," Discussion papers e-20-001, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.

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