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Optimal fisheries quota allocation under a transferable quota (TQ) management system

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  • Morgan, GR

Abstract

Although the concept of transferable quota management in fisheries is rapidly gaining acceptance as a more appropriate management technique than such alternatives as input controls, the basic question of how to optimally allocate initial quotas among the participants of potential participants in a fisheries has not yet received adequate theoretical consideration. Current practices of allocation by administrative decision have perhaps been the source of greatest discontent in the introduction of transferable quota management systems, as well as being economically inefficient. This paper draws upon the extensive theory and practical experience gained in other industries (such as the communication, airline and financial industries) in the allocation of scarce resources to examine the relative efficiency and effectiveness of current and alternative quota allocation systems in a fisheries context. The role of secondary markets in correcting inefficiencies in initial quota allocation is also examined. It is shown that, in these other industries, an auction process has evolved which can lead to the achievement of a wide range of public policy objectives in an economically efficient manner. The application of such an auction process to the allocation of fisheries quotas is considered and the features of such a fisheries quota auction system are presented.

Suggested Citation

  • Morgan, GR, 1995. "Optimal fisheries quota allocation under a transferable quota (TQ) management system," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 19(5), pages 379-390, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:marpol:v:19:y:1995:i:5:p:379-390
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    Cited by:

    1. Kim, Hwa Nyeon & Woodward, Richard T. & Griffin, Wade L., 2005. "Transferable Rights of Recreational Fishery: An Application to Red Snapper Fishery in the Gulf of Mexico," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19261, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    2. Heaps, Terry, 2003. "The effects on welfare of the imposition of individual transferable quotas on a heterogeneous fishing fleet," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 557-576, November.
    3. Alcalde, José & Dahm, Matthias, 2013. "Competition for procurement shares," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 193-208.
    4. Kanchanaroek, Yingluk & Termansen, Mette & Quinn, Claire, 2013. "Property rights regimes in complex fishery management systems: A choice experiment application," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 363-373.
    5. Holzer, Jorge & McConnell, Kenneth, 2023. "Extraction rights allocation with liquidity constraints," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).
    6. Terry L. Anderson & Ragnar Arnason & Gary D. Libecap, 2010. "Efficiency Advantages of Grandfathering in Rights-Based Fisheries Management," NBER Working Papers 16519, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Boukherroub, Tasseda & LeBel, Luc & Ruiz, Angel, 2017. "A framework for sustainable forest resource allocation: A Canadian case study," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 66(PB), pages 224-235.
    8. Colin Hunt, 1997. "Economic Instruments for Environmental and Natural Resource Conservation and Management in the South Pacific," Working Papers in Ecological Economics 9706, Australian National University, Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, Ecological Economics Program.

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