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Land use and decentralized government: A strategic approach for playing a short-sighted equilibrium

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  • Aprile, Maria Carmela
  • Chiarini, Bruno
  • Marzano, Elisabetta

Abstract

This paper presents a simple strategic model (defined as a shortsighted game) to highlight the incentives for local governments to allow the exploitation of land in areas not suitable for such exploitation due to environmental or other risks. Municipal discretionary policy inevitably produces strategic complementarities and guides individuals to use the land (to choose the most beneficial “shortsighted” Nash equilibrium). In light of these results, it seems possible to state that the definition of non-exploitable territory and the decisions concerning it should not be left to local governments.

Suggested Citation

  • Aprile, Maria Carmela & Chiarini, Bruno & Marzano, Elisabetta, 2019. "Land use and decentralized government: A strategic approach for playing a short-sighted equilibrium," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:lauspo:v:89:y:2019:i:c:s0264837718314066
    DOI: 10.1016/j.landusepol.2019.104220
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    Cited by:

    1. Fa Tian & Shiying Hou, 2022. "The Impact of Green Finance on Industrial Land Use Efficiency: Evidence from 279 Cities in China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(10), pages 1-16, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Land exploitation; Municipal policy; Strategic complementarities; Myopic equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • Q24 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Land

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