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An intersection of privatization and public utility regulation: The Ohio State University's energy concession agreement

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  • Dormady, Noah C.
  • Jones, Douglas N.
  • Roe, Brian E.
  • Rub, Guy A.

Abstract

U.S. colleges and universities have for some time joined the privatization movement where university functions and assets are turned over to private contractors. Here we present a case of a 50-year comprehensive energy concession agreement by The Ohio State University that generated an up-front payment exceeding a billion dollars. The agreement, with many principles and design practices borrowed directly from economic regulation of public utilities and against the backdrop of the literature on privatization and contract theory, provides an insightful case that informs these literature, as well as future privatization efforts by universities and other large-scale public organizations.

Suggested Citation

  • Dormady, Noah C. & Jones, Douglas N. & Roe, Brian E. & Rub, Guy A., 2019. "An intersection of privatization and public utility regulation: The Ohio State University's energy concession agreement," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 1-1.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:59:y:2019:i:c:4
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jup.2019.100929
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Privatization; Public utility regulation; Public-private partnerships; Contracting out; University concessions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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