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The governance of industry rules and energy system innovation: The case of codes in Great Britain

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  • Lockwood, Matthew
  • Mitchell, Catherine
  • Hoggett, Richard
  • Kuzemko, Caroline

Abstract

•Detailed energy industry rules are crucial to realising policy goals, but typically overlooked.•Governance arrangements determine ease of rule change for policy goals.•Delegation is a widespread institutional design principle but has risks of capture and inertia.•The case of code governance in Britain gives a demonstration of these risks.•A reform agenda is outlined and wider lessons drawn out.

Suggested Citation

  • Lockwood, Matthew & Mitchell, Catherine & Hoggett, Richard & Kuzemko, Caroline, 2017. "The governance of industry rules and energy system innovation: The case of codes in Great Britain," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 41-49.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:47:y:2017:i:c:p:41-49
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jup.2017.06.008
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    2. Andrei Shleifer, 2005. "Understanding Regulation," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 11(4), pages 439-451, September.
    3. Barry M. Mitnick, 2011. "Capturing ‘Capture’: Definition and Mechanisms," Chapters, in: David Levi-Faur (ed.), Handbook on the Politics of Regulation, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    5. Pierson, Paul, 2000. "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 94(2), pages 251-267, June.
    6. Faure-Grimaud, Antoine & Martimort, David, 2003. "Regulatory Inertia," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(3), pages 413-437, Autumn.
    7. Matthew Lockwood & Caroline Kuzemko & Catherine Mitchell & Richard Hoggett, 2017. "Historical institutionalism and the politics of sustainable energy transitions: A research agenda," Environment and Planning C, , vol. 35(2), pages 312-333, March.
    8. Catherine Mitchell, 2016. "Momentum is increasing towards a flexible electricity system based on renewables," Nature Energy, Nature, vol. 1(2), pages 1-6, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hoicka, Christina E. & Lowitzsch, Jens & Brisbois, Marie Claire & Kumar, Ankit & Ramirez Camargo, Luis, 2021. "Implementing a just renewable energy transition: Policy advice for transposing the new European rules for renewable energy communities," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 156(C).

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