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Empowering irrigation: A game-theoretic approach to electricity utilization in Indian agriculture

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  • Kimmich, Christian
  • Sagebiel, Julian

Abstract

This research uses a game-theoretic approach to analyze electric power provision for irrigation in Andhra Pradesh, based on results from interview and survey data. Farmers face a coordination problem of collectively preserving electric power quality and a linked dilemma of obtaining sufficient electric infrastructure capacity from utilities. Low equilibria prevail due to asymmetric payoffs and farmers not knowing electric network properties. The findings derived from survey data, empirical tests, and model synthesis indicate how the capacity dilemma can be overcome to enable coordinated technology adoption via farmers' and utilities’ investment into energy-efficient and economically viable technology. Coordinated demand-side measures could effectively reduce energy use and support adaptation to climate change.

Suggested Citation

  • Kimmich, Christian & Sagebiel, Julian, 2016. "Empowering irrigation: A game-theoretic approach to electricity utilization in Indian agriculture," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 43(PB), pages 174-185.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:juipol:v:43:y:2016:i:pb:p:174-185
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jup.2016.10.002
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    3. Majid Hashemi & Glenn Jenkins, 2021. "The Economic Benefits of Mitigating the Risk of Unplanned Power Outages," Working Paper 1468, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    4. Sukhgeet Kaur & Michael G. Pollitt, 2024. "Output vs input subsidies in agriculture: a discrete choice experiment to estimate farmers’ preferences for rice and electricity subsidies in Punjab," Working Papers EPRG2406, Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
    5. Hashemi, Majid & Jenkins, Glenn, 2022. "Can privatization of distribution substations improve electricity reliability for non-residential customers? An application to Nepal," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    6. Ghosh, Ranjan & Goyal, Yugank & Rommel, Jens & Sagebiel, Julian, 2017. "Are small firms willing to pay for improved power supply? Evidence from a contingent valuation study in India," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 659-665.
    7. Lan T. Pham & Ilona M. Otto & Dimitrios Zikos, 2019. "Self-Governance and the Effects of Rules in Irrigation Systems: Evidence from Laboratory and Framed Field Experiments in China, India and Vietnam," Water Economics and Policy (WEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(01), pages 1-28, January.

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