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Optimal resource extraction contract with adverse selection

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  • Hung, Nguyen Manh
  • Poudou, Jean-Christophe
  • Thomas, Lionel

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  • Hung, Nguyen Manh & Poudou, Jean-Christophe & Thomas, Lionel, 2006. "Optimal resource extraction contract with adverse selection," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 78-85, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jrpoli:v:31:y:2006:i:2:p:78-85
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jean-Christophe Poudou & Lionel Thomas, 2000. "Concession minière et asymétrie d'information," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 143(2), pages 129-138.
    2. Baron, David P. & Besanko, David, 1984. "Regulation and information in a continuing relationship," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 267-302.
    3. Petter Osmundsen, 1998. "Dynamic Taxation of Non-renewable Natural Resources Under Asymmetric Information About Reserves," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 31(4), pages 933-951, November.
    4. Livernois, John R & Uhler, Russell S, 1987. "Extraction Costs and the Economics of Nonrenewable Resources," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(1), pages 195-203, February.
    5. Gaudet, Gerard & Lassere, Pierre & Long, Ngo Van, 1995. "Optimal Resource Royalties with Unknown and Temporally Independent Extraction Cost Structures," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(3), pages 715-749, August.
    6. Sweeney, James L., 1993. "Economic theory of depletable resources: An introduction," Handbook of Natural Resource and Energy Economics, in: A. V. Kneese† & J. L. Sweeney (ed.), Handbook of Natural Resource and Energy Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 17, pages 759-854, Elsevier.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gérard Gaudet & Pierre Lasserre, 2015. "The Management of Natural Resources Under Asymmetry of Information," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 7(1), pages 291-308, October.
    2. David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet & Francesco Ricci, 2018. "Extracting information or resource? The Hotelling rule revisited under asymmetric information," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 49(2), pages 311-347, June.
    3. Julie Ing, 2012. "The impact of commitment on nonrenewable resources management with asymmetric information on costs," Working Papers 1205, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    4. van der Ploeg, Frederick & Rohner, Dominic, 2012. "War and natural resource exploitation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(8), pages 1714-1729.
    5. Scandizzo, Pasquale L. & Ventura, Marco, 2010. "Sharing risk through concession contracts," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 207(1), pages 363-370, November.
    6. Christopher Costello & Nicolas Querou & Agnès Tomini, 2014. "Spatial concessions with limited tenure," Post-Print hal-01123392, HAL.
    7. David Martimort & Jerome Pouyet & Francesco Ricci, 2018. "Contracts for the Management of a Non-Renewable Resource under Asymmetric Information and Structural Price Breaks," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 132, pages 81-103.
    8. Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Sébastien Roussel, 2010. "Contract Design to Sequester Carbon in Agricultural Soils," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 10060, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    9. Qidan Hu & Ying Peng & Chunxiang Guo & Dong Cai & Peiyang Su, 2019. "Dynamic Incentive Mechanism Design for Recycling Construction and Demolition Waste under Dual Information Asymmetry," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(10), pages 1-24, May.
    10. Julie Ing, 2012. "The impact of commitment on nonrenewable resources management with asymmetric information on costs," Working Papers halshs-00690896, HAL.
    11. Julie Ing, 2016. "Adverse selection, commitment and exhaustible resource taxation," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 16/263, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    12. Calvo, Jorge Andrés Perdomo & Pérez, Ana María Jaramillo, 2016. "Optimal extraction policy when the environmental and social costs of the opencast coal mining activity are internalized: Mining District of the Department of El Cesar (Colombia) case study," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 159-166.
    13. Ing, Julie, 2020. "Adverse selection, commitment and exhaustible resource taxation," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    14. François Castonguay & Pierre Lasserre, 2016. "Resource Agency Relationship with Privately Known Exploration and Extraction Costs," CIRANO Working Papers 2016s-56, CIRANO.
    15. Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Sebastien Roussel, 2014. "Payments for Carbon Sequestration in Agricultural Soils: Incentives for the Future and Rewards for the Past," CEEES Paper Series CE3S-01/14, European University at St. Petersburg, Department of Economics.
    16. Lappi, Pauli, 2020. "On optimal extraction under asymmetric information over reclamation costs," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).

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