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Bank capital and credit market competition: Will competitive pressure lead to higher capital levels?

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  • Chen, Yehning

Abstract

This paper establishes a theoretical model to study the relationship between credit market competition and bank capital. In the model, bank capital can alleviate the debt overhang problem, and the extent to which banks can enjoy the gain of holding capital is decreasing in the competitive pressure in the credit market. It is shown that credit market competition reduces banks' incentive to hold capital. Deposit insurance also induces banks to hold less capital. In addition, bank capital regulation is welfare improving, and banks may voluntarily hold capital in excess of regulatory minimums.

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  • Chen, Yehning, 2016. "Bank capital and credit market competition: Will competitive pressure lead to higher capital levels?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 247-263.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jimfin:v:69:y:2016:i:c:p:247-263
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jimonfin.2016.07.006
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    Cited by:

    1. Okahara, Naoto, 2018. "銀行の資本構成と自己資本比率規制 [Banks' capital structures and capital regulations]," MPRA Paper 89869, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Shaofang Li, 2021. "Quality of Bank Capital, Competition, and Risk-Taking: Some International Evidence," Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 57(12), pages 3455-3488, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank capital; Debt overhang; Credit market competition; Capital regulation; Deposit insurance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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