When should homeless families get subsidized apartments? A theoretical inquiry
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"An adverse selection model of optimal unemployment insurance,"
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Cited by:
- O'Flaherty, Brendan & Scutella, Rosanna & Tseng, Yi-Ping, 2018. "Private information, exits from homelessness, and better ways to operate rehousing programs," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 93-105.
- O'Flaherty, Brendan, 2019. "Homelessness research: A guide for economists (and friends)," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 1-25.
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Homelessness Homeless shelters Optimal contract menus;Statistics
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