The distributional impact of housing discrimination in a non-Walrasian setting
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Cited by:
- Hanson, Andrew & Hawley, Zackary, 2011.
"Do landlords discriminate in the rental housing market? Evidence from an internet field experiment in US cities,"
Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2-3), pages 99-114, September.
- Hanson, Andrew & Hawley, Zackary, 2011. "Do landlords discriminate in the rental housing market? Evidence from an internet field experiment in US cities," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 99-114.
- Andrew Hanson & Zackary Hawley, 2011. "Do Landlords Discriminate in the Rental Housing Market? Evidence from an Internet Field Experiment in U.S. Cities," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2011-05, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
- John Mc Breen & Florence Goffette-Nagot & Pablo Jensen, 2011. "Information and Search on the Housing Market: An Agent-based Model," ERSA conference papers ersa11p1395, European Regional Science Association.
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