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The distributional impact of housing discrimination in a non-Walrasian setting

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  • Bradburd, Ralph
  • Sheppard, Stephen
  • Bergeron, Joseph
  • Engler, Eric
  • Gee, Evan

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  • Bradburd, Ralph & Sheppard, Stephen & Bergeron, Joseph & Engler, Eric & Gee, Evan, 2005. "The distributional impact of housing discrimination in a non-Walrasian setting," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 61-91, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhouse:v:14:y:2005:i:2:p:61-91
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Gale,Douglas, 2000. "Strategic Foundations of General Equilibrium," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521644105, September.
    3. Dhananjay K. Gode & Shyam Sunder, 1997. "What Makes Markets Allocationally Efficient?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(2), pages 603-630.
    4. Ralph Bradburd & Stephen Sheppard & Joseph Bergeron & Eric Engler, 2006. "The Impact Of Rent Controls In Non‐Walrasian Markets: An Agent‐Based Modeling Approach," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(3), pages 455-491, August.
    5. Yavas, Abdullah, 1994. "Middlemen in Bilateral Search Markets," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 12(3), pages 406-429, July.
    6. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
    7. Black, Dan A, 1995. "Discrimination in an Equilibrium Search Model," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(2), pages 309-333, April.
    8. Yinger, John, 1997. "Cash in Your Face: The Cost of Racial and Ethnic Discrimination in Housing," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 339-365, November.
    9. Courant, Paul N., 1978. "Racial prejudice in a search model of the urban housing market," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 329-345, July.
    10. Ondrich, Jan & Stricker, Alex & Yinger, John, 1999. "Do Landlords Discriminate? The Incidence and Causes of Racial Discrimination in Rental Housing Markets," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 185-204, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hanson, Andrew & Hawley, Zackary, 2011. "Do landlords discriminate in the rental housing market? Evidence from an internet field experiment in US cities," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 99-114.
    2. John Mc Breen & Florence Goffette-Nagot & Pablo Jensen, 2011. "Information and Search on the Housing Market: An Agent-based Model," ERSA conference papers ersa11p1395, European Regional Science Association.

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